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Generic but Expensive: Why Prices Can Remain 
High for Off-Patent Drugs 
FRAZER A. TESSEMA,† AARON S. KESSELHEIM,† MICHAEL S. SINHA† 
Brand-name prescription drugs are sold at extremely high prices in the US because patents and 
other market exclusivities provided by the government allow manufacturers to exclude direct 
competition. This period of market exclusivity was intended for pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to recoup costs associated with research and development of those products and make profits. 
The other intended outcome of this system is that the market exclusivity period for brand-name 
drugs should be self-limited, with competition being able to flourish after the market 
exclusivities end. Such competition has been most effectively supplied by generic drug 
manufacturers that produce Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved bioequivalent 
versions of the brand-name product. The market entry of these generic drugs—with market 
uptake augmented by automatic substitution of brand-name prescriptions at the pharmacy—
remains the only market intervention that lowers prescription drug prices consistently and 
substantially. 
Generic manufacturers can make their drugs available at considerably lower cost because of 
various market advantages they have over brand-name drugs. When this process does not 
operate as intended, drug prices do not fall after market exclusivity expiration, or prices for 
generic drugs may actually increase. In this paper, we examine the variety of factors that 
mitigate the cost savings associated with introduction of interchangeable generic drugs, 
especially older, off-patent drugs. We then consider policy solutions that may help stabilize the 
generic drug marketplace, diminishing the frequency and impact of generic price increases.
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INTRODUCTION 
Brand-name prescription drugs are sold at extremely high prices in the 
United States because patents and other market exclusivities provided by the 
government allow manufacturers to exclude direct competition. This period of 
market exclusivity was intended for pharmaceutical manufacturers to recoup 
costs associated with research and development of those products and make 
profits.1 The other intended outcome of this system is that the market 
exclusivity period for brand-name drugs should be self-limited, with 
competition being able to flourish after market exclusivity ends. Such 
competition has been most effectively supplied by generic drug manufacturers 
that produce Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved bioequivalent 
versions of the brand-name product.2 The market entry of these generic 
drugs—with market uptake augmented by automatic substitution of brand-
name prescriptions at the pharmacy—remains the only market intervention that 
lowers prescription drug prices consistently and substantially.3 Drugs with just 
three interchangeable generic competitors attain a 40% median reduction from 
brand-name price, and those with six manufacturers attain a 62% median 
reduction.4 In 2018, generic drugs represented 90% of all prescriptions 
dispensed in the United States, but accounted for only 22% of total drug 
spending.5 Generic drugs also accounted for an estimated savings of $293 
billion in 2018, including savings of $137 billion to Medicare and Medicaid, 
with total savings of $2 trillion over the previous decade.6 
Generic manufacturers can make their drugs available at considerably 
lower cost because of various market advantages they have over brand-name 
drugs. First, generic manufacturers have an abbreviated pathway to market in 
which they can receive FDA approval upon demonstrating bioequivalence to 
the brand-name version, which involves less clinical testing than is required for 
new drug approval. Second, upon market entry, generics can achieve high 
levels of market penetration because state drug product selection laws allow 
pharmacists to dispense them when a patient receives a prescription for the 
brand-name version. As such, generics need not rely on changing physician 
 
 1. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Determinants of Market Exclusivity for Prescription Drugs in the United 
States, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1659 (2017). 
 2. Kerstin Noëlle Vokinger et al., Strategies that Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1665 (2017). 
 3. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and 
Prospects for Reform, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858, 861 (2016). 
 4. Chintan V. Dave et al., Prices of Generic Drugs Associated with Numbers of Manufacturers, 377 
NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 2597, 2598 (2017). 
 5. See ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., THE CASE FOR COMPETITION: 2019 GENERIC DRUG & 
BIOSIMILARS ACCESS & SAVINGS IN THE U.S. REPORT 8 (2019). 
 6. Id. at 9–10.  
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prescribing practices—often influenced by substantial marketing budgets of 
brand-name manufacturers—to gain market share. 
When this process does not operate as intended, drug prices do not fall 
after market exclusivity expiration. Prices for generic drugs may actually 
increase. For example, some drugs may not attract many generic competitors—
perhaps because fewer patients use the prescription—which reduces the size of 
the potential revenue stream. A 2017 study demonstrated that between 2008 
and 2014, prices of generic drugs with three or fewer competitors remained 
considerably higher than those in more competitive markets.7 In some cases, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have acquired marketing rights to off-patent 
products with little to no generic competition, subsequently increasing the 
price of those products abruptly and substantially, which has resulted in public 
and political outcry.8 As part of its investigation into the problem of high 
generic drug prices, the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging produced a 
bipartisan report identifying sole-source drug status and small patient market 
size as two key factors leading to generic drug price increases.9 Such products 
can be susceptible to disruptions in drug supply, leading to shortages and price 
increases that often persist even after the shortage is resolved.10 
Other factors may also contribute to generic drug price increases. Recent 
antitrust litigation alleges that a variety of anticompetitive practices by several 
generic manufacturers have contributed to increases in the price of many 
common generic drugs.11 Another cause of intentional disruption to the generic 
drug marketplace came as a result of the FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative 
(UDI), which awarded three years of market exclusivity to manufacturers who 
conducted studies of older, off-patent drugs.12 The program, which ran from 
2006 to 2015, resulted in higher prices and an increase in both the number and 
duration of drug shortages because generic competitors were forced to 
discontinue production.13  
These examples underscore the important point that generic drug cost 
reductions emerge through robust competition among generic manufacturers. 
 
 7. See Dave et al., supra note 4, at 2598.  
 8. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Valeant, Turing Boosted Drug Prices to Fuel 
Preset Profits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-turing-boosted-
drug-prices-to-fuel-preset-profits-1454445342.  
 9. S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 1, 4 (2016). 
 10. Inmaculada Hernandez et al., Changes in Drug Pricing After Drug Shortages in the United States, 
170 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 74, 74 (2019); see also Michail Alevizakos et al., The Impact of Shortages on 
Medication Prices: Implications for Shortage Prevention, 76 DRUGS 1551, 1551 (2016). 
 11. In re Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Michael S. Sinha 
et al., Antitrust, Market Exclusivity, and Transparency in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
2271, 2271 (2018). 
 12. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2018); see also Ravi Gupta et al., The FDA Unapproved Drugs 
Initiative: An Observational Study of the Consequences for Drug Prices and Shortages in the United States, 23 
J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 1066, 1066 (2017); Aaron Hakim et al., High Costs of FDA 
Approval for Formerly Unapproved Marketed Drugs, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2181, 2181 (2017). 
 13. Gupta et al., supra note 12, at 1066. 
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However, even if generic competition has been established and the price of the 
drug has settled at a level closer to its production cost, prices can increase once 
again if generic competitors leave the market and remaining competitors seek 
to leverage increased market share. The severity and frequency of price 
increases affecting the generic drug market is becoming a source of alarm. One 
study found price increases of over 400% for at least fifty older generic 
medications between 2012 and 2015.14 Between 2010 and 2015, prices 
increased by 100% or more for 315 of 1441 (22%) generic drugs sold in the 
United States.15 Price increases can detrimentally impact the ability of patients 
to access these products and lead to negative health outcomes, all while 
increasing the cost to government and private payors. 
Patients, legislators, and the FDA have called for novel approaches to 
foster generic price competition. In this paper, we examine the variety of 
factors that mitigate the cost savings associated with introduction of 
interchangeable generic drugs, especially older, off-patent drugs. We then 
consider policy solutions that may help stabilize the generic drug marketplace 
and diminish the frequency and impact of generic price increases.  
I.  CONSOLIDATED MARKETS 
When brand-name market exclusivity ends—usually due to the expiration 
of one or more patents protecting the drug—generic competitors can begin to 
enter the market. Since they are interchangeable at the pharmacy level, generic 
manufacturers predominantly compete with each other by driving down prices 
close to the cost of production, which results in steeper price reductions as 
more competitors enter the market for a particular product.16 Since the passage 
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Act),17 generic competition has been associated with substantially 
 
 14. Ana D. Vega et al., Commentary on Current Trends in Rising Drug Costs and Reimbursement Below 
Cost, 25 MANAGED CARE 41, 43–44 tbl.1 (2016). 
 15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE: PART D 
GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 12 (2016). 
 16. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2020). 
 17. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, & 42 U.S.C.). After passage of The Hatch-Waxman 
Act in 1984, the number of generics in the small-molecule drug market has risen from 15% to 90%. See FDA 
Approves More Generic Drugs, but Competition Still Lags, PEW TRUSTS (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/02/fda-approves-more-generic-drugs-
but-competition-still-lags (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). The act catalyzed a major shift in the role that generics 
play in regulating drug price in the pharmaceutical market. Of note, the Hatch-Waxman Act implicitly 
acknowledges the limited price decreases associated with small numbers of manufacturers. See id. The first 
generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV certification and successfully invalidate brand-name drug patents 
receives a 180-day period of generic marketing exclusivity, during which other generic competitors are 
foreclosed from entering the market. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 
1589. During this government-mandated duopoly period, the generic manufacturer is free to set prices at near 
brand-name level. See FDA Approves More Generic Drugs, but Competition Still Lags, supra. 
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lower drug costs. But in certain cases, over the last three decades in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical market, robust competition has not ensued after market 
exclusivity ends. Factors that contribute to such an outcome include financial 
disincentives to enter the generic manufacturer market, decreased competition 
due to market withdrawals from rival generic manufacturers, and merger and 
acquisition activity between manufacturers that decreases the number of 
manufacturers for a particular drug or set of drugs. Finally, the FDA’s short-
lived UDI program further induced consolidation, disrupting an often-robust 
generic marketplace for older drugs while re-establishing a market monopoly. 
In each of these settings, prices are affected by manufacturers maintaining 
near-monopoly pricing power. 
A. NICHE DRUG MARKETS 
Niche drug markets are often characterized by limited competition, in part 
because niche drugs may be difficult to manufacture or may benefit smaller 
patient populations, as is true with drugs to treat rare diseases. As such, niche 
drugs tend to face limited potential for generic manufacturer entry—if they 
face generic competition at all. Niche drug markets are often served by three or 
fewer generic manufacturers. These less-competitive markets pose an obstacle 
to price reduction once a brand-name drug’s market exclusivity period expires 
because, under near-monopolistic market conditions, generic manufacturers 
have less incentive to lower prices. Some generic manufacturers in these 
markets raise their prices gradually over time, while in other cases, 
manufacturers have used strong market positioning to raise prices in dramatic 
fashion.  
Niche drug markets for older, off-patent drugs typically emerge in 
response to conditions that result in manufacturers leaving the market. These 
conditions may include limited profitability, limited efficacy compared to 
newer treatments, less desirable routes of administration or dosing regimens 
compared to newer-in-class products,18 and inability to generate sufficient 
revenue to compensate for costly and complex manufacturing processes.19 In 
many ways, niche drug markets follow a similar pattern to that of drugs for 
 
 18. Of note, if a drug has limited therapeutic benefit or onerous dosing regimens compared to other in-
class drugs, there may be too few patients to support competitive market conditions despite high disease 
prevalence in the United States, and despite having more than three manufacturers. For instance, captopril 
(Capoten, approved 1981), a first-generation angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor approved in 
1981, was effective but required multiple doses per day. Captopril (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/captopril-oral-route/proper-use/drg-20069213 (last updated 
Feb. 1, 2020). After captopril went off-patent, second-generation ACE inhibitors with improved dosing 
regimens displaced the use of captopril. Jonathan D. Alpern, High-Cost Generic Drugs—Implications for 
Patients and Policymakers, 371 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1859, 1860 (2014). The use of captopril decreased and 
the number of manufacturers of the drug listed in the FDA’s Orange Book dropped more than half from 2000 
to 2012 (from 22 to 10). Between November 2012 and November 2013, the price of captopril rose by more 
than 2800%, from 1.4 cents to 39.9 cents per pill. Alpern, supra. 
 19. Céline Pulcini et al., Ensuring Universal Access to Old Antibiotics: A Critical but Neglected Priority, 
23 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 590, 591 (2017).  
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rare diseases,20 as there may be too few patients receiving the drug to support 
robustly competitive markets. The limited earning potential of these niche 
markets is often reflected in corporate pricing strategies for these products.21  
Recent studies have found an association between manufacturers in a 
drug market and pricing. A 2006 FDA study noted a steady decrease in 
average relative price of generic drugs as the number of generic manufacturers 
increased.22 A 2017 analysis replicated that effect for a cohort of drugs from 
2008 to 2014, but noted a more muted effect of earlier entrants on generic 
price.23 The largest decrease in price—17%—was observed between generic 
drugs with three manufacturers and those with four manufacturers.24 A 
separate study of generic market competition levels from 2008 to 2013 found 
that over a six-year period, baseline level of market competition was associated 
with increased drug price by the end of the study period.25 Finally, among a 
cohort of 1113 generic drugs on the market from 2008 to 2016, 235 (21%) had 
three or fewer manufacturers.26 In April 2017, there were 170 oral drug 
formulations approved by the FDA for which market exclusivity had ended 
that had three or fewer FDA-approved generic versions.27 Perhaps more 
concerning, critical medicines are among these drugs with too few 
manufacturers. A 2016 study found that seventeen anti-infective medications 
 
 20. Established under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, orphan-designated drugs are those that treat 
populations of 200,000 or fewer in the United States at the time of FDA approval. Ameet Sarpatwari et al., 
Evaluating the Impact of the Orphan Drug Act’s Seven-Year Market Exclusivity Period, 37 HEALTH AFF. 732, 
732 (2018). These products receive an extended regulatory exclusivity period of seven years upon approval. 
Id. Though the seven-year exclusivity period was intended to increase research and development into drugs to 
treat rare diseases, a recent study suggests that the incentive effect of the seven-year period has diminished 
over time. See id. at 736. 
 21. A 2015 report on orphan drug prices and a 2017 analysis of oncologic orphan products found that the 
price of these drugs rose exponentially as the number of patients who have the condition decreased. See Igho J. 
Onakpoya et al., Effectiveness, Safety and Costs of Orphan Drugs: An Evidence-Based Review, 5 BRIT. MED. 
J. OPEN e007199 (2015); IQVIA INST., ORPHAN DRUGS IN THE UNITED STATES: GROWTH TRENDS IN RARE 
DISEASE TREATMENTS (2018). Exceptionally high prices were common for so-called “ultra-orphan” diseases. 
See Onakpoya et al., supra, at e007202. 
 22. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 16. 
 23. Dave et al., supra note 4, at 2598 fig.1. 
 24. Id. at 2597–98. 
 25. Chintan V. Dave et al., High Generic Drug Prices and Market Competition: A Retrospective Cohort 
Study, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 145, 148 (2017). This study defined “quadropoly,” “duopoly,” and “near-
monopoly” competition levels using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
preferred method of quantifying market competition. HHI calculates market competition levels by summing 
the squares of the market shares of individual firms (generic manufacturers). Index values range from 
approaching 0 (reflecting an extremely competitive generic market) to 10,000 (a monopoly). Drug competition 
levels were assigned to HHI values as follows: quadropoly (HHI 2500), duopoly (HHI 5000), near-monopoly 
(HHI 8000), and monopoly (HHI 10,000). Id. at 146–47. Compared to drugs with baseline quadropoly 
competition, genericized drugs with duopoly, near-monopoly, and monopoly competition levels in 2008 were 
associated with relative price differences of 29.2%, 75.8%, and 115.9% respectively in 2013. Id. at 149. 
 26. This 2008 to 2016 cohort was derived from the authors’ database used in Dave et al., supra note 12. 
 27. Ravi Gupta et al., Affordability and Availability of Off-Patent Drugs in the United States—The Case 
for Importing from Abroad: Observational Study, THE BMJ (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.bmj.com/content/360/ 
bmj.k831. 
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on the World Health Organization (WHO) Essential Medicines List were 
produced by three or fewer manufacturers.28 In niche drug markets, each 
manufacturer holds tremendous power to set the price for the drug.  
Table 1 shows a list of recent price increases among generic drugs, many 
of which exist in niche markets. For instance, at the time of its price increases 
of close to 1000% from 2012 to 2014, digoxin was only manufactured by three 
companies.29 Similarly, when one of the two manufacturers producing 
glycopyrrolate temporarily halted production due to quality control issues, the 
remaining manufacturer raised prices by about 334%.30 Once a manufacturer 
of a particular drug becomes the sole source, prices can increase substantially, 
unfettered by the threat of competition. The 2016 U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging report noted that sole-source manufacturers “could 
exercise de facto monopoly pricing power, and then impose and protect 
astronomical price increases.”31 This was the case for many drugs listed within 
the Senate report, including pyrimethamine, tiopronin, penicillamine, trientine, 
isoproterenol, sodium nitroprusside, and seromycin.32 For many of these drugs, 
internal company documents revealed strategies aimed at maximizing price 
and profitability via price gouging.33 
B. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Another factor that contributes to high generic drug prices is market 
consolidation, which most frequently occurs via mergers of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers or acquisitions of pharmaceutical product lines.34 In the generics 
sector, market consolidation can leave certain generic drugs susceptible to 
price increases. Subpoenaed email exchanges between corporate officials have 
uncovered corporate pricing strategies after mergers and acquisitions; 
corporate executives will often reevaluate the drug’s competition and demand, 
raising prices accordingly.35 This may be to recoup the costs of the merger or 
acquisition or to obtain maximal revenues from a noncompetitive 
marketplace.36 Merger activity attracts particular scrutiny by the Federal Trade 
 
 28. Jonathan D. Alpern et al., Essential Medicines in the United States—Why Access Is Diminishing, 374 
NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1904, 1906 (2016). 
 29. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rapid Price Increases for Some Generic Drugs Catch Users by Surprise, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/health/some-generic-drug-prices-are-soaring.html. 
 30. Jacqueline LaPointe, Hospitals Saw 23% Rise in Inpatient Prescription Drug Spending, REVCYCLE 
INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 12, 2016), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/hospitals-saw-23-rise-in-inpatient-
prescription-drug-spending; see also James King, How Pharma Execs Jacked Up the Prices of 5 Other Critical 
Drugs, VOCATIV (Sept. 22, 2015, 4:02 PM), https://www.vocativ.com/233557/how-pharma-execs-jacked-up-
the-prices-of-5-other-critical-drugs/index.html. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 4 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 6 tbl.1. 
 33. Id. at 39–41, 44–45, 62–63, 86–87. 
 34. Ravi Gupta et al., The Impact of Off-Patent Drug Acquisitions on Prices, 33 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
1007, 1007 (2018). 
 35. See S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 44–45. 
 36. See id. at 45. 
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Commission when it involves acquisitions of direct competitor products, as in 
2005 when Ovation Pharmaceuticals acquired the sole competitor to an 
indomethacin formulation used in neonatal cardiac care.37 
A 2018 analysis of recent pharmaceutical merger and acquisition activity 
found that the median price for a cohort of thirty-seven off-patent, brand-name 
drugs (with either monopoly or duopoly levels of competition) more than 
doubled after acquisition.38 As shown in Table 1, generic drug price increases 
often follow merger or acquisition activity. In fact, the 2016 U.S. Senate 
report noted that manufacturers such as Retrophin, Turing, and Valeant 
attributed their price increases on acquired product lines to profit motives.39 
Subpoenaed internal company documents revealed that executives pursued 
acquisitions with the explicit intent to raise the price in consolidated niche drug 
markets with few or no competitors.40 Retrophin acquired tiopronin because it 
was “woefully underpriced;” Valeant admitted to a “patient as hostage” model 
of drug pricing, focused on acquiring drugs for rare diseases and raising the 
price dramatically.41 
Other studies demonstrate that targeted acquisition of non-patent-
protected products is a common business strategy. A 2017 study of market 
consolidation found that in 2008, nearly half (546 of 1120 drugs) were at 
duopoly or near-monopoly levels of competition, and by 2013, the average 
level of market concentration for the cohort remained at duopoly-level.42 There 
was also a noticeable uptick in mergers and acquisitions among generic 
manufacturers from 2014 to 2016, increasing from twenty-two deals to forty-
two deals.43  
C. FDA UNAPPROVED DRUGS INITIATIVE 
From 2006 to 2015, the FDA launched the UDI, which led to the 
unintended consequence of increased prices among older drugs that were no 
longer protected by any patent-based exclusivities. The program sought to 
encourage testing of drugs marketed in the United States prior to 1938 that 
were grandfathered into the market and had never undergone official FDA 
 
 37. Press Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Ovation Pharmaceuticals for Illegally Acquiring 
Drug Used to Treat Premature Babies with Life-Threatening Heart Condition (Dec. 16, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/ftc-sues-ovation-pharmaceuticals-illegally-acquiring-
drug-used. 
 38. See Gupta et al., supra note 34, at 1008 tbl.1. Of note, the authors also observed a trend toward higher 
prices for acquired brand-name drugs compared to non-acquired brand name drugs, though the difference was 
not statistically significant. Id. at 1008. 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 32–73. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 45, 58. 
 42. See Dave et al., supra note 25, at 148. Duopoly levels of competition were defined as those with HHI 
greater than 5000. Near-monopoly levels of competition were defined as those with HHI greater than 8000. Id. 
at 146. 
 43. Marc-André Gagnon & Karena D. Volesky, Merger Mania: Mergers and Acquisitions in the Generic 
Drug Sector from 1995 to 2016, 13 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 62, 66 fig.2 (2017). 
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review for efficacy or safety.44 The FDA reached out to manufacturers of the 
products, encouraging those interested in conducting clinical trials to conduct 
studies and bring the product through the formal regulatory approval process, 
in exchange for 3 years of market exclusivity.45 The UDI enabled 
manufacturers to force competitors to stop production, creating monopoly 
market conditions that would facilitate dramatic price increases. 
In total, thirty-four previously unapproved prescriptions drugs received 
exclusivities through the UDI.46 In one study of the program, the average 
wholesale price of twenty-six drugs increased by a median of 37% over the 
two years prior to, and after, approval via the UDI pathway.47 The price of 
certain drugs rose more dramatically; for example, vasopressin increased in 
price by 1138% (from $12.83 per vial to $158.83) and neostigmine increased 
in price by 531% (from $27.74 per vial to $175.14 per vial).48  
While the UDI contributed to higher prices for some critical drugs, it did 
not incentivize manufacturers to undertake important new studies of these 
drugs before submitting them for FDA approval. In fact, nearly 90% of the 
drugs approved via the UDI already had evidence-based support for their use.49 
One of those drugs, colchicine, was in widespread use in the United States 
since the 19th century as a treatment for gouty arthritis.50 In 2007, URL 
Pharma ran a week-long trial of colchicine on 185 patients that confirmed the 
drug’s efficacy under a new dosing regimen.51 Upon entering the market, URL 
Pharma forced other colchicine products off the market and raised the price by 
over 5000% (from $0.09 to $4.85 per pill).52 Another consequence of 
colchicine’s dramatic price increases was that the financial burden to payers 
and patients often led to missed doses and relapses for patients with familial 
Mediterranean fever, a secondary indication for colchicine therapy.53  
Upon receipt of a three-year UDI exclusivity term for neostigmine in 
2013, Éclat Pharmaceuticals asked the FDA via Citizen Petition to mandate 
market withdrawal of generic neostigmine against five other manufacturers, 
asserting that the neostigmine products by those manufacturers were “marketed 
 
 44. Many of these drugs were approved prior to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which 
mandated safety testing for the first time as a requirement of drug approval. They were grandfathered by the 
statute and allowed to remain on the market. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 46. Id. at 1069. 
 47. Id. at 1069–71. 
 48. Philip J. Almeter et al., U.S. Food and Drug Administration Disruption of Generic Drug Market 
Increases Hospital Costs, 127 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1414, 1416 (2018).  
 49. See Gupta et al., supra note 12, at 1066. 
 50. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Daniel H. Solomon, Incentives for Drug Development—The Curious Case of 
Colchicine, 362 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 2045, 2045 (2010).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2046; see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Watson Pharm. Inc., No. CV 09-5700 PA, 2009 WL 
3401117, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009) (noting that the price had raised from $9 per bottle to $485 per 
bottle). 
 53. Wayne W. Grody & Terri Getzug, Colchicine’s Other Indication—Effect of FDA Action, 363 NEW 
ENG. J. MEDICINE 2267, 2267–68 (2010).  
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with incomplete labeling that may raise potential safety risks.”54 With 
competitor products removed from the marketplace, Éclat and its parent 
company Flamel Technologies subsequently increased the price of its 
neostigmine product on two occasions between 2013 and 2015.  
The UDI ended in 2015 without evidence that the program had been 
successful in generating new knowledge about the drugs approved via the 
initiative.55  
II.  DECREASED DRUG SUPPLY 
Apart from niche markets and consolidation, sudden drug shortages can 
also lead to market conditions that enable generic price increases. In times of 
shortage, demand remains constant as supply diminishes; such conditions 
allow manufacturers to increase prices as shortages begin and persist, often 
keeping prices elevated even after the shortage resolves. Other settings, such as 
market discontinuation of a competitor with sizeable market share, can lead to 
shortages of other drugs in the short-term, as supply can no longer keep up 
with demand. 
A. DRUG SHORTAGES 
Drug shortages are defined by the FDA as “situation[s] in which the total 
supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an FDA-regulated drug 
[are] inadequate to meet the current or projected demand at the patient level.”56 
In 1999, the FDA introduced the Drug Shortage Staff program—a group 
within the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) charged 
with detecting potential and actual drug shortages in the United States.57 In 
2013, the FDA drafted a “Strategic Plan for Preventing and Mitigating Drug 
Shortages” as part of a congressional mandate within the FDA Safety and 
Innovation Act (FDASIA).58 As part of the Strategic Plan, the FDA began 
 
 54. ÉCLAT PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, NO. FDA-2013-P-1000, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT THE 
COMMISSIONER OF FOOD AND DRUGS TAKE IMMEDIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST UNAPPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS BEING ILLEGALLY MARKETED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO AN EXISTING FDA-APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCT, AND TO SECURE THE REMOVAL OF THESE PRODUCTS FROM THE MARKET 1 (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.fdanews.com/ext/resources/files/archives/10113-01/09-05-13-EclatPetition.pdf. 
 55. Other approvals and regulatory exclusivities have had the effect of pushing and keeping competitors 
off the market. For instance, Sun Pharma, the sole manufacturer of the drug dichlorphenamide (initially 
approved in 1958), received orphan drug approval and seven years of market exclusivity for use in treating 
periodic paralysis, thereby precluding manufacturers from producing generic versions of the drug for other 
uses, including glaucoma. Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/detailedIndex.cfm?cfgridkey=314210 (last visited Feb. 
11, 2020). 
 56. Rachel B. Morgan, Drug Shortages: Preserving the Drug Supply, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/drug-shortages-preserving-the-drug-supply.aspx. 
 57. Valerie Jensen, Preventing and Mitigating Drug Shortages—FDA’s and Manufacturers’ Roles, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/newsevents/ucm493617.pdf. 
 58. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES 
(2013), https://www.fda.gov/media/86907/download. 
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formally tracking and publishing lists of drug shortages to better inform 
patients and prescribers.59 Manufacturers are now required to report shortages 
to the FDA,60 and the American Society of Health-Systems Pharmacists 
(ASHP) also maintains an updated list of drug shortages.61 While the FDA can 
offer regulatory guidance to facilitate needed drug production in times of 
shortage, the agency cannot compel a pharmaceutical manufacturer to resume 
production of a drug, increase production of a drug, or alter patterns of drug 
distribution.62  
From 2005 to 2011, shortages of generic drugs more than quadrupled 
(from 61 to more than 250 drugs),63 while the number of drugs affected by 
shortages nearly tripled between 2007 and 2012 (154 to 456).64 This trend may 
be slowing: the FDA reported that the number of new and persisting drug 
shortages has stabilized over the last five years.65 The FDA attributes this 
reduction in drug shortages to its prevention and mitigation strategies.66 
Shortages among generic drugs are associated with drug price increases. 
A study of 917 drugs in shortage from December 2015 to December 2016 
found price increases of 7.3% before the shortage and 16% after the shortage.67 
Niche market drugs in shortage exhibited greater price increases than those in 
more competitive markets: market prices increased 12.1% pre-shortage and 
27.4% post-shortage, as compared to 2.5% pre-shortage growth and 4.8% post-
shortage growth for drugs with more than three manufacturers.68 Another study 
of twenty-nine generic injectable drug shortages resolved between 2010 and 
2015 found that the change in quarterly average sales price increased 
substantially after the shortage began.69 After six months, there was a 22.6% 
increase and after one year, a 33.7% increase, as compared to decreases of 7% 
six months and 26.2% one year pre-shortage.70  
The duration of drug shortages also impacts the severity of price 
increases. In a study of 309 drugs in shortage from 2008 to 2014, researchers 
 
 59. Id. at 18–19. 
 60. Drug Shortages Infographic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ 
DrugShortages/ucm441579.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2019). 
 61. Drug Shortages List, AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, https://www.ashp.org/Drug-
Shortages/Current-Shortages/Drug-Shortages-List?page=CurrentShortages (last visited Apr. 15, 2020).  
 62. See Jensen, supra note 58.  
 63. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON DRUG SHORTAGES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2017 2 (2018) [hereinafter REPORT ON DRUG SHORTAGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2017]; 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON DRUG SHORTAGES FOR 
CALENDAR YEAR 2016 2 (2017). 
 64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-194, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT 
CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 13 (2014). 
 65. See REPORT ON DRUG SHORTAGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2017, supra note 63, at 3 fig.1. 
 66. Id. at 1. 
 67. See Hernandez et al., supra note 10, at 74. 
 68. Id. 
 69. P. Hur et al., Generic Injectable Shortages and Trends in Average Sales Price in the United States, 
19 VALUE IN HEALTH A4, A4 (2016).  
 70. Id. 
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found that as shortages persisted, prices continued to increase in a stepwise 
fashion.71 As compared to drugs without shortages, median price increases for 
drugs with shortages were 6% for a shortage duration lasting less than 6 
months, 10.9% for a shortage duration lasting 6 to 12 months, 14.2% for a 
shortage duration lasting 12 to 18 months, and 14% for shortage duration 
lasting greater than 18 months.72 
Price increases during the shortage period are concerning, not just 
because they increase costs during that time period, but also because price 
increases commonly persist well after the shortage is resolved. A study of 
inpatient Medicare Part B generic and brand-name drugs in a shortage found a 
4.3% quarterly price increase during a shortage and 4.1% increase in the post-
shortage period, as compared to a 0.5% reduction in price growth pre-
shortage.73 According to the analysis, drugs in shortage had 2150% greater 
price growth than other readily available products.74  
In the past two years, there have been several notable price increases 
associated with generic injectable drug shortages. Injectable opioids have been 
in chronic shortage after Pfizer, the dominant manufacturer, reduced 
production in the wake of the opioid epidemic.75 Other notable injectable drugs 
that have faced recent shortage and price increases include the intravenous 
drugs diltiazem, potassium chloride, ondansetron, and cefepime. Unforeseen 
disruptions to manufacturing can also limit availability of generic products. In 
September 2017, destruction of generic manufacturing facilities in Puerto Rico 
during Hurricane Maria resulted in shortages of intravenous saline infusions.76 
Prevention of drug shortages therefore remains a key tool for preserving 
low generic drug prices. However, it can be challenging to pinpoint the reasons 
for a shortage, which may be multifactorial.77 For example, even the UDI 
program appears to have contributed to drug shortages during the program’s 
existence.78 One study exploring the causes of shortages found that three-in-
four shortages with a known cause related to manufacturing issues, particularly 
raw material acquisition and manufacturing delays.79 Generics are most 
 
 71. Chintan V. Dave et al., Predictors of Drug Shortages and Association with Generic Drug Prices: A 
Retrospective Cohort Study, 21 VALUE IN HEALTH 1286, 1288 (2018).  
 72. Id. at 1289 tbl.3. 
 73. See Alevizakos et al., supra note 10, at 1554.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Casey Ross, Hospitals Are Confronting a New Opioid Crisis: An Alarming Shortage of Pain Meds, 
STAT (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/15/hospitals-opioid-shortage/.  
 76. Chana A. Sacks et al., The Shortage of Normal Saline in the Wake of Hurricane Maria, 178 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 885, 885 (2018).  
 77. Erin R. Fox et al., ASHP Guidelines on Managing Drug Product Shortages in Hospitals and Health 
Systems, 66 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1399, 1400–02 (2009); Rob Stein, Shortages of Key Drugs 
Endanger Patients, WASH. POST (May 1, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/shortages-of-key-
drugs-endanger-patients/2011/04/26/AF1aJJVF_story.html. 
 78. See Gupta et al., supra note 12, at 1072. The median shortage duration in the two years before and 
after voluntary approval or UDI action increased from 31 days (IQR = 0-339) to 217 days (IQR = 0-406), 
though due to the small sample size, the finding was just below the threshold of significance (p=0.053). Id. 
 79. See Dave et al., supra note 71, at 1288. 
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susceptible to manufacturing disruptions in cases of more than 90% single-
source manufacturing and sole source raw materials.80 Of the 117 drug 
shortages reported in 2012, the FDA identified a variety of reasons: 
manufacturing issues (37%), raw material unavailability (27%), and delay and 
capacity issues (27%) were the major causes.81 Other less common causes 
included increased demand (5%), loss of manufacturing site (2%), and 
discontinuation (2%).82 A 2013 analysis of generic injectable drugs found 
similar justifications for shortages.83  
Certain characteristics of drugs also raise the risk of a shortage. Perhaps 
the single greatest predictor of a drug’s predisposition to shortage is the 
product’s formulation type. Generic injectable drugs appear to be 
disproportionately affected by shortages. A recent report found that, as 
compared to tablets, solutions and extended-release capsules were more likely 
to be associated with drug shortages.84 According to the American Society of 
Healthcare-System Pharmacists, in July 2018, there were 174 generics in 
shortage and 137 of these drugs (78.7%) were injectable.85 In March 2019, 
there were 226 generics in shortage and 155 of these drugs (68.6%) were 
injectable.86 The FDA has confirmed that “a high percentage of drug shortages 
have been, and continue to be, sterile injectables, including chemotherapy, 
anesthesia, and other acute drugs.”87  
Another reliable predictor of shortage was the generic drug’s pre-shortage 
price. When compared to medium- and high-priced generic drugs, low-priced 
drugs had a greater risk of drug shortages.88 This study did not find an 
association between risk of shortage and market competition levels or market 
size, respectively.89 This finding suggests that factors that may exacerbate the 
price increases associated with shortage—such as small market size and low 
competition levels—may not be useful in predicting the likelihood of 
impending shortage. 
Among the drugs listed in Table 1, benazepril/HCTZ, cycloserine, 
dextroamphetamine, digoxin, divalproex, doxycycline, epinephrine 
autoinjector, indomethacin, mechlorethamine, and penicillamine have appeared 
on the FDA’s drug shortage list at some point since 2016. 
 
 80. Erin R. Fox, Remarks at the Federal Trade Commission: Understanding Competition in Prescription 
Drug Markets Workshop: Medication Access—Perspective from a Purchaser (Nov. 8, 2017). 
 81. See Jensen, supra note 57. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Morgan, supra note 56.  
 84. See Dave et al., supra note 71, at 1288. Odds ratio of 1.67 for generic injectable drugs (95% CI 1.00-
2.79) and 2.64 for generic extended-release capsules (95% CI 1.58-4.42). Id. 
 85. See AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, supra note 61. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 60. 
 88. Dave et al., supra note 71, at 1288. 
 89. Id. 
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B. MARKET WITHDRAWALS 
Companies must notify the FDA six months before permanently 
discontinuing drug products that are “life supporting, life sustaining, or 
intended for use in the prevention or treatment of a debilitating disease or 
condition.”90 According to the FDA, among all drug shortages with known 
explanations, shortages due to product discontinuations were low in 2012 
(7%).91 
Market withdrawals can impact pricing. Sodium nitroprusside was FDA-
approved in 1974 as a potent, rapid acting antihypertensive agent; patents 
covering the drug expired in 1981,92 and two manufacturers entered the market 
within the next year.93 The brand-name manufacturer, Hoffman-La Roche, 
voluntarily withdrew its product from the market in September 1996, leaving 
only three sodium nitroprusside products on the market.94 From 2008 to 2011, 
Abbott and Teva produced the only two sodium nitroprusside products, and by 
2012, Teva ceased manufacture of its generic, leaving Abbott’s product as the 
sole marketed product.95 In December 2013, the drug was sold to Marathon 
Pharmaceuticals, which sold it to Valeant in February 2015, along with other 
drugs,96 for $350 million.97 That day, Valeant tripled the price from $2148 to 
$8808 per ten, two milliliter vials.98  
Market withdrawals may also have the effect of creating shortages of 
drugs within the same therapeutic class.99 For example, Merck’s anthelmintic 
agent thiabendazole was first approved in 1967 to treat gastrointestinal 
 
 90. 21 C.F.R. § 600.82 (2020). 
 91. See Morgan, supra note 56. 
 92. Original NDA and Original BLA Approvals September 1981, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=reportsSearch.process&rptName=2&reportS
electMonth=9&reportSelectYear=1981&nav (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 93. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 3-158 (3d ed. 1982). 
 94. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., et al., 61 Fed. Reg. 40,649 (Aug. 5, 1996) (withdrawing approval of 87 
new drug applications, 18 abbreviated antibiotic drug applications, and 103 abbreviated new drug 
applications); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 3-470 (17th ed. 1997); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 3-449 (16th ed. 1996). 
 95. Bracco Diagnostics et al., 78 Fed. Reg. 43,210 (July 19, 2013) (withdrawing approval of fifty-two 
new drug applications and seventy-seven abbreviated new drug applications); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS 6-301 (32d ed. 2012). 
 96. Dems Seek Info on Valeant Drug Price Spikes, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 15, 2015, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150815/NEWS/150819923.  
 97. Joseph Walker, Revolt Against Sky-High Drug Prices Prompts a Pioneer to Cash Out, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bipartisan-backlash-on-drug-prices-prompts-one-company-to-cash-out-
1493754978 (last updated May 2, 2017, 11:59 PM). 
 98. See S. REP. NO. 114–429, at 6 tbl.1 (2016). 
 99. See Alpern et al., supra note 18, at 1860. 
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infections like tapeworm and hookworm.100 By 1974, Janssen Pharmaceuticals 
began manufacturing a second-in-class therapeutic alternative, mebendazole.101 
Generic entry occurred for mebendazole in 1995, and in 1996, SmithKline 
Beecham obtained approval for a third product, albendazole, with the same 
mechanism of action.102 When thiabendazole fell out of use because of 
frequent and severe side effects,103 generic mebendazole and brand-name 
albendazole became the primary treatments for combating these soil-
transmitted helminths. From 2007 to 2010, mebendazole and albendazole were 
both sole-source products: Teva produced mebendazole and 
GlaxoSmithKline—a corporate descendant of SmithKline Beecham—
produced albendazole.104 In 2010, GlaxoSmithKline sold albendazole’s 
marketing rights to Amedra Pharmaceuticals, and a year later, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals discontinued mebendazole for business reasons.105 This left 
albendazole as the only anthelmintic product on the market. From 2010 to 
2013, Amedra leveraged its market position to increase the price of 
albendazole from $5.92 to $119.58 per day (over 2000%).106 
III.  ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
In addition to high drug prices arising from niche markets, consolidations, 
and decreased drug supply, manufacturers can engage in anticompetitive 
practices that enable price increases. For example, to sustain price increases in 
the generic market, some generic manufacturers have used their market 
positions to negotiate exclusive deals with payors that preclude coverage of 
competitors.107 For its extended-release formulation of dextroamphetamine (a 
drug first FDA-approved in 1975), Shire Pharmaceuticals signed contracts with 
insurers Humana and UnitedHealthcare mandating that the insurers cover their 
product only.108 Mylan Pharmaceuticals used a similar tactic to sell its 
epinephrine auto-injector (EpiPen) anaphylaxis treatment (a drug-device 
 
 100. Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=016096 (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
 101. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 3-200 (17th ed. 1997). 
 102. Id. 
 103. David I. Grove, Treatment of Strongyloidiasis with Thiabendazole: An Analysis of Toxicity and 
Effectiveness, 76 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y OF TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 114, 114 (1982). 
 104. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, (27th ed. 2007); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (28th ed. 2008); U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 
(29th ed. 2009); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (30th ed. 2010).  
 105. See Alpern et al., supra note 18, at 1860. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, Patients Are Told. Until They Are Not., N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/health/prescription-drugs-brand-name-
generic.html. 
 108. See id. 
TESSEMA ET AL-71.4.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:39 PM 
May 2020] GENERIC BUT EXPENSIVE 1035 
combination containing epinephrine, which was first synthesized in 1904)109: 
contracts with school districts at discounted prices precluded districts from 
purchasing rival epinephrine products.110 Some manufacturers negotiate deals 
with payers that preclude competitor coverage through bundling of rebates. In 
2016, for example, Shire Pharmaceuticals launched Xiidra, an ophthalmic 
solution for dry eye containing cyclosporine (a drug first FDA-approved in 
1983). After Shire launched Xiidra, Allergan—the first manufacturer of 
ophthalmic cyclosporine—made deals with Medicare Part D plans that 
foreclosed Xiidra from entering the market.111 Finally, restricted distribution 
systems also limit competition by preventing potential competitors from 
obtaining samples they might need to do the necessary tests to earn FDA 
approval, such as occurred with Turing’s Daraprim Direct program (for the 
drug pyrimethamine, first used clinically in 1953).112  
Forty-four state attorney generals brought antitrust litigation, with claims 
relating to a number of generic drugs and involving several generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.113 The complaint alleges collusion by generic 
manufacturers in two ways: agreements to divide the market geographically, 
and agreements to maintain or raise prices in coordination—in some cases on 
the same day.114 For example, on April 4, 2014, Teva, Mylan, Actavis, Lupin, 
Novartis’ Sandoz, Taro Pharmaceuticals, and others raised the price of twenty-
two generic drugs, including the antibiotic cephalexin (+90–185%), the 
antifungal ketoconazole (+110%) and the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 
diflunisal (+182%).115 Teva was reported to have colluded with “every 
significant competitor” via phone or text from 2013–2014.116  
Teva Pharmaceuticals, in particular, made several dramatic one-day price 
increases. For instance, on July 3, 2013, Teva allegedly colluded to raise the 
price of twenty-one drugs, including the overactive bladder treatment 
oxybutynin chloride (+1500%); the antifungal nystatin (+1570%); and the 
antihypertensive nadolol (+2762%).117 In the summer of 2013 alone, the 
lawsuit estimates that antitrust tactics netted Teva an extra $937 million in 
 
 109. M.R. Bennett, One Hundred Years of Adrenaline: The Discovery of Autoreceptors, 9 CLINICAL 
AUTONOMIC RES. 145, 145 (1999). 
 110. Ike Swetlitz & Ed Silverman, Mylan May Have Violated Antitrust Law in Its EpiPen Sales to 
Schools, Legal Experts Say, STAT (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/25/mylan-antitrust-
epipen-schools/. 
 111. David Balto, Drug “Rebate Walls” Should Be Dismantled by the FTC’s Antitrust Arm, STAT (Dec. 
4, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/12/04/ftc-dismantle-drug-rebate-walls/. 
 112. Michael A. Carrier et al., Using Antitrust Law to Challenge Turing’s Daraprim Price Increase, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1381 (2016). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Generic Pharma. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 814 (E.D. Pa. 2019); 
Complaint, Connecticut v. Teva Pharma. USA, 2019 WL 2126100 (D. Conn. May 10, 2019) (No. 3:19-cv-
00710-MPS). 
 114. Complaint, supra note 113, at 2. 
 115. Id. at 224, 234, 237. 
 116. Id. at 35.  
 117. Id. at 182, 173, 152. 
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additional revenue per quarter.118 The lawsuit notes that, in part because of 
such activity, between July 2013 and July 2014, “[t]he prices of more than 
1,200 generic medications increased an average of 448 percent.”119 The lawsuit 
also revealed the casual nature of the inter-generic collusion. Companies had 
their own lingo, calling the market the “sandbox”—where it was implied 
manufacturers would “play nice.”120 As manufacturers divided the market by 
territory, they made sure that each company got its “fair share.”121 Deals were 
negotiated by phone, email, and text, and at industry functions. Sales 
representatives would attend “girls nights out”—ostensibly events for women 
in the industry—and discuss sensitive information, according to the 
complaint.122 
Such anticompetitive practices undermine efforts to lower generic prices 
through greater generic manufacturer entry into niche drug markets. These 
examples demonstrate that sustained antitrust oversight may be necessary to 
ensure robust generic competition. In the coming years, maintaining generic 
competition may also be more difficult because fewer manufacturers are 
willing to produce low-cost generic drugs and the generic pharmaceutical 
industry has consolidated.123 
IV.  POLICY SOLUTIONS 
As seen in Figure 1, to ensure the sustainability of reasonable prices for 
generic drugs, it is critical to understand the interconnected nature of the 
factors influencing generic drug price increases. Consolidation of drug markets 
via mergers and acquisitions (Factor 1) reduces the number of manufacturers 
and can create niche drug market conditions (Factor 2). In such markets, there 
is a monopoly (or near-monopoly) on manufacturing, meaning that the drug 
may be prone to shortage (Factor 3) due to limited raw material availability, 
manufacturing plant closures, or safety recalls. Mergers and acquisitions 
(Factor 1) that consolidate market share into the hands of a few large 
manufacturers can also make those drug markets prone to shortage (Factor 3). 
This may be due to reduced production, discontinuation of a product line, or 
the process of shifting manufacturing to new facilities, or differential access to 
raw materials.124 Finally, regulatory policy decisions (Factor 4) can interact 
with any of the other three domains. The UDI created monopolies and led to 
greater rates of shortages. The FDA is also the gatekeeper for new generic 
 
 118. Id. at 211. 
 119. Id. at 50. 
 120. Id. at 41. 
 121. Id. at 33. 
 122. Id. at 32. 
 123. Ravi Gupta et al., Generic Drugs in the United States: Policies to Address Pricing and Competition, 
105 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 329, 331–32 (2019); see also Ernst R. Berndt et al., The 
Landscape of U.S. Generic Prescription Drug Markets, 2004–2016 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23640, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23640.pdf. 
 124. See Gagnon & Volesky, supra note 43, at 67.   
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manufacturers seeking to enter the market, compete on prices, or help resolve 
shortages.  
 
FIGURE 1. INTERPLAY OF FACTORS INCREASING THE RISKS FOR CHANGES IN 
GENERIC DRUG PRICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The FDA now expedites review of ANDA applications for drugs with 
three or fewer manufacturers, an acknowledgment that niche drugs that are 
vulnerable to pricing strategies could limit patient access to important 
medications.125 The FDA also established a semi-annual list of “Off-Patent, 
Off-Exclusivity Drugs without an Approved ANDA” to stimulate competition 
in the generic drug marketplace and offers to hold early-stage meetings with 
generic manufacturers seeking to enter these markets.126  
Ensuring robust generic drug markets and reasonable prices will 
involve policy action in a number of areas: (1) stimulating generic competition; 
(2) preventing and mitigating drug shortages; (3) generic drug importation; (4) 
non-profit generic manufacturing; (5) greater antitrust enforcement; (6) federal 
initiatives; and (7) state-based initiatives. 
A. STIMULATING GENERIC COMPETITION  
Fostering competition in the generic drug marketplace will be critical 
to limiting the potential for generic drug shortages and price increases. This 
will require a strong pipeline of generic drug applications coupled with 
efficient FDA review of those applications. 
Until recent years, generic drug applications could take about three 
years on average to be reviewed by the FDA.127 The FDA’s capacity to review 
 
 125. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Tackles Drug Competition to Improve Patient 
Access (June 27, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm564725.htm.  
 126. List of Off-Patent, Off-Exclusivity Drugs Without an Approved Generic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(last updated Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/abbreviated-new-drug-application-anda/list-patent-
exclusivity-drugs-without-approved-generic. 
 127. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 17. Note: When assessing the likelihood of market 
competition after price increases on its recently-acquired drugs like pyrimethamine, Turing sought to exploit 
FDA’s three-year delay in ANDA approvals. See S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 35 (2016). 
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generic drug applications markedly increased after 2015 with the passage of 
the Generic Drug User Fee Amendment (GDUFA), which established a system 
of user fees to subsidize the FDA’s generic drug review process.128 In 2014, 
the FDA released guidance expediting applications for generic drugs in critical 
need and with the potential to mitigate shortages.129 As part of this initiative, 
the FDA prioritized “first generics” for which there is no generic approved, 
“sole-source” drugs with only one FDA-approved supplier, and drugs in 
shortage.130 Generic review times have dropped to less than a year on average, 
and GDUFA was reauthorized under the FDA Reauthorization Act (FDARA) 
of 2017 (GDUFA II). There may be additional opportunities to improve the 
generic drug application process; for example, ANDAs have historically taken 
three to four review cycles before the FDA approves the application.131 For 
new drug applications, by comparison, 88% were approved on the first review 
cycle in 2017.132 GDUFA II created a pre-ANDA review program to address 
this inefficiency.  
Besides prioritizing “first generics” for “sole-source” drugs, the FDA 
introduced the Drug Competition Action Plan in June 2017 to promote greater 
generic competition in niche drug markets. As noted previously, the program 
expedites regulatory review for generic drug markets consisting of three or 
fewer manufacturers.133 Another provision of FDARA focused on expediting 
the review of so-called “competitive generic therapies”—products that lack 
significant competition.134 Products fitting this description would be eligible 
for new 180-day periods of generic market exclusivity, based on the 
assumption that artificially inflated generic prices during this period would 
provide incentive for additional market entry, followed by more sustainable 
lower prices and mitigated risk of future drug shortages.135 The first 
competitive generic therapy designation was awarded in August 2018.136 
 
 128. Id. at 26. 
 129. Manual of Policies and Procedures: Priortization of the Review of Original ANDAs, Amendments, 
and Supplements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 27, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/ 
published/Prioritization-of-the-Review-of-Original-ANDAs--Amendments--and-Supplements.pdf. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Generic Drug User Fee Amendments: Accelerating Patient Access to Generic Drugs: Hearing on 
Examining Generic Drug User Fee Amendments, Focusing on Accelerating Patient Access to Generic Drugs 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong. 6 (2016) (statement of Janet 
Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration). 
 132. Patrick Frey, Remarks at the Food & Drug Admin. & Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs. Summit 
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/ 
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/UCM587690.pdf. 
 133. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 125.  
 134. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMPETITIVE GENERIC 
THERAPIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 3 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-
drugs-gen/documents/document/ucm631401.pdf. 
 135. Id. at 1.  
 136. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Generic Drug Under New Pathway 
Aimed at Enhancing Market Competition for Sole Source Drugs (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm616167.htm. 
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B. PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES 
The FDA works closely with manufacturers to address the underlying 
causes of shortages to mitigate the public health risk associated with these 
events. In addressing manufacturing and product quality issues contributing to 
shortage, the FDA will often evaluate the process of manufacturing the drug, 
including quality standards of the manufacturing facility.137 According to the 
FDA, manufacturing problems can range from the wrong expiration date on a 
package to contamination or sterility issues.138 The FDA also convenes other 
generic manufacturers producing the drug to determine if they have the 
capacity and the willingness to increase short-term production to help alleviate 
shortages.139  
As part of the FDA’s 2013 “Strategic Plan for Preventing and 
Mitigating Drug Shortages,”140 the agency offered strategies to strengthen its 
response after the onset of shortage. Strategies to mitigate drug shortages 
include improved data collection and response tracking databases, close work 
with manufacturers on remediation efforts that can rapidly alleviate shortages, 
and best practices to avoid future shortages.141 The FDA is also working to 
identify ways to promote and sustain manufacturing improvements, to detect 
early warning signals of supply chain disruption, and to engage stakeholders 
on issues relating to drug shortages.142 In July 2018, the FDA established a 
Drug Shortages Task Force to explore long-term solutions the agency can take 
to prevent shortages.143 According to the agency, the Task Force works closely 
with pharmaceutical and health care industry representatives, patient 
representatives, Congress, and other federal partners while soliciting public 
input through stakeholder meetings.144 Most recently, in October 2019 the 
FDA’s Drug Shortages Task Force released a report titled “Drug Shortages: 
Root Causes and Possible Solutions,” which offers three recommendations: 
(1) improved understanding causes and costs of shortages; (2) creation of a 
ratings system for quality management of individual manufacturing facilities to 
incentivize more reliable production; and (3) payment incentives, including 
private sector contracting, to ensure a steady supply of essential drugs.145 
 
 137. See Jensen, supra note 57. 
 138. Frequently Asked Questions About Drug Shortages, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-shortages/frequently-asked-questions-about-drug-shortages (last updated July 
5, 2018). 
 139. See Jensen, supra note 57. 
 140. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 58. 
 141. Id. at 4–6. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Press Release, Statement by FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Formation of a New Drug 
Shortages Task Force and FDA’s Efforts to Advance Long-Term Solutions to Prevent Shortages (July 12, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm613346.htm.  
 144. Id. 
 145. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUG SHORTAGES: ROOT CAUSES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 7–9 
(2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/132059/download. 
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C. GENERIC DRUG IMPORTATION 
In December 2019, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) proposed a rule to allow certain prescription drugs to be 
imported from Canada.146 According to HHS, the rule is designed to permit 
importation "under specific conditions that ensure the importation poses no 
additional risk to the public's health and safety."147 The rule would give states 
and select non-federal government entities the ability to submit importation 
proposals to the FDA for review and authorization.148 Importation programs 
would be eligible for co-sponsorship with a pharmacist, a wholesaler, or 
another state or non-federal governmental entity.149 
Besides this HHS rule proposal to allow Canadian drug importation, 
other recent attempts have been made to legalize drug importation through 
federal law-making. Several recent bills introduced in Congress seek to expand 
the FDA’s ability to enable well-regulated importation of prescription drugs 
from outside the United States, particularly in the case of shortages or extreme 
price increases. In January 2019, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and 
Representatives Elijah Cummings (D-MD) and Ro Khanna (D-CA) introduced 
the Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act, which would allow 
importation of any generic prescription drug for which the U.S. price is higher 
than the average price in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and 
Japan and for which federal officials have determined the price is excessively 
high.150 A related amendment had been introduced in January 2017 by 
Senators Sanders and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), seeking to allow U.S. citizens 
to purchase prescription medications from approved Canadian pharmacies.151 
Importation of generic drugs could dramatically lower drug costs in the short-
term.152 The threat of importation could also deter strategies such as those used 
by Turing and Valeant to raise prices for off-patent drugs in the United 
States.153 Yet skepticism about drug importation persists: four recent FDA 
 
 146. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Trump Administration Takes Historic Steps to Lower 
U.S. Prescription Drug Prices (Dec. 19, 2019) https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/12/18/trump-
administration-takes-historic-steps-to-lower-us-prescription-drug-prices.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act, S. 97, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Press 
Release, Bernie Sanders, Sweeping Plan to Lower Drug Prices Introduced in Senate and House (Jan. 10, 
2019), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sweeping-plan-to-lower-drug-prices-
introduced-in-senate-and-house. 
 151. Affordable and Safe Prescription Drug Importation Act, S. 469, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Jeff 
Stein, How Cory Booker Went from Progressive Hero to Traitor in Under 2 Days, VOX (Jan. 14, 2017, 9:50 
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/14/14262732/cory-booker-senate-democrats. 
 152. See Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Drug Importation Address High Generic Drug 
Prices? (Brookings Inst., Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings, Working Paper No. 29, 
2017). 
 153. Matthew Cohen et al., Policy Options for Increasing Generic Drug Competition Through 
Importation, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20190103.333047/full/. 
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Commissioners expressed concern, noting that the agency could never be 
certain of the safety of imported drugs.154  
Realizing price reduction from safe importation should be attainable 
under current regulatory standards. The United States already imports 40% of 
its “finished product” pharmaceuticals from overseas.155 An estimated 80% of 
active ingredients are imported as well,156 though these drug products are 
generally repackaged and sold by U.S.-based drug manufacturers.157 In the 
absence of federal action on wholesale importation, a new bill from Senators 
Charles Grassley (R-IA) and Klobuchar, the Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics Act, seeks to allow individuals to import drugs from Canada for 
personal use.158 Although such wholesale importation of drugs is not currently 
permitted, the FDA does sanction limited importation during emergency 
shortages.159 Over the past decade, the agency has allowed temporary 
importation from Canada, Ireland, Australia, and the United Kingdom.160 
Notably, a clause in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 authorizes the FDA to import drugs from Canada, 
but that provision has never been invoked.161  
Large-scale importation, if allowed, could offer an important 
counterweight to prevent companies from predatory price increases on certain 
sole-sourced U.S. drugs. In July 2018, the FDA announced the formation of a 
working group to explore importation options for such “sole-source medicines 
with limited patient availability, but no blocking patents or exclusivities.”162 A 
2018 study found that nearly half of the forty-four off-patent drugs made by a 
single U.S. manufacturer were already available from a different manufacturer 
in at least one of seven foreign countries with similar regulatory standards as 
the United States (European Union, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, South Africa, and Israel).163  
Importation may therefore serve an important role in deterring 
unreasonable price increases due to monopolies or near-monopolies on generic 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 124, 115th Cong. (2017); Press Release, Amy 
Klobuchar, Klobuchar, Grassley Introduce New Bipartisan Legislation to Crack Down on Pharmaceutical Pay-
for-Delay Deals (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/12/klobuchar-
grassley-introduce-new-bipartisan-legislation-to-crack-down-on-anticompetitive-pay-for-delay-deals-
affecting-biosimilars-as-well-as-generic-drugs. 
 159. See Jensen, supra note 57. 
 160. See Cohen et al., supra note 153.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Press Release, Statement by FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on the Formation of a New 
Work Group to Develop Focused Drug Importation Policy Options to Address Access Challenges Related to 
Certain Sole-Source Medicines with Limited Patient Availability, but No Blocking Patents or Exclusivities 
(July 19, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-
gottlieb-md-formation-new-work-group-develop-focused-drug. 
 163. See Gupta et al., supra note 27, at 3–4. 
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drug production. While importation could lower prices for drugs facing 
dramatic price increases, competing factors may limit this effect. For instance, 
if the United States were to allow drug importation, pharmaceutical companies 
might simply adjust global prices, which could mitigate the cost-savings of 
importing drugs while reducing foreign incentives to export to the United 
States.164 Even if foreign countries and manufacturers were willing to export 
drugs, differences in population size and manufacturing capacity may make 
long-term exportation to the United States infeasible. Canada, a country often 
touted as a potential source of drug importation, has an estimated population of 
37 million—about 11% of the estimated U.S. population of 327 million.165 
Given such differences in population, the US may not be able to rely on 
Canadian imports to curtail long-term generic drug shortages. 
D. NON-PROFIT GENERIC MANUFACTURING 
New business models may also address problems with niche generic 
drug markets. In recent years, non-traditional generic drug manufacturers have 
emerged, including non-profit companies and drug compounding facilities. 
The first large U.S. non-profit to begin manufacturing generic drugs was 
Civica Rx, a consortium of four health care institutions working with the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to bring affordable generic products to 
particularly capricious and volatile markets.166 Civica Rx plans to initially 
focus on inpatient products which may involve sterile manufacturing. 
In the past few years, large hospitals—including Massachusetts 
General Hospital in Boston, Druid City Hospital Health System in Alabama, 
and others—have built compounding facilities that combine drugs with 
multiple active ingredients in-house, avoiding costly brand-name and generic 
drugs sold for the same purpose.167 A similar model exists in Sweden, where 
 
 164. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Niteesh K. Choudhry, The International Pharmaceutical Market as a Source 
of Low-Cost Prescription Drugs for U.S. Patients, 148 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 614, 617 (2008). There would 
be significant challenges incentivizing foreign countries to export drugs. As current FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb noted in 2016, drug companies that produce sole-source drugs often control global production lines as 
well, and they are:  
“[N[ot going to simply ramp up the production lines to accommodate new demand, if it means that 
the drugs will be imported into the U.S. to skirt their tiered pricing. Nor will the foreign countries 
allow their local supply to be skimmed off, only to create local shortages of important medicines.”  
Arlene Weintraub, FDA to Consider Drug Importation in Battle Against High Drug Prices, FORBES (July 19, 
2018, 10:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arleneweintraub/2018/07/19/fda-to-consider-drug-
importation-in-battle-against-high-drug-prices/ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dr. Scott Gottlieb). 
 165. Jonathon Gatehouse, Canada’s Population Tops 37 Million After Record Two-Year Surge, CBC 
NEWS (June 14, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational/national-today-newsletter-trrump-sued-
canada-population-1.4700759. 
 166. See Press Release, Intermountain Healthcare, Leading U.S. Health Systems Announce Plans to 
Develop a Not-for-Profit Generic Drug Company (Jan. 18, 2018, 6:02 AM), 
https://intermountainhealthcare.org/news/2018/01/leading-us-health-systems-announce-plans-to-develop-a-
not-for-profit-generic-drug-company/.  
 167. A Windfall from In-House Compounding: $900,000 Savings Projected, PHARMACOLOGY TECH. REP. 
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.pharmacytechnologyreport.com/Hazardous-Drugs-Handling/article/09-17/A-
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the government set up a generic manufacturer (called Apoteket) to produce any 
unavailable drugs.168 In the United States, legislators have proposed 
establishing government-sanctioned generic manufacturers for prescription 
drugs that are unaffordable or unavailable. In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren 
(D-MA) and Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) introduced the Affordable 
Drug Manufacturing Act, which would establish an Office of Drug 
Manufacturing within the Department of Health and Human Services, charged 
with “lowering prices, increasing competition, and addressing shortages in the 
market for prescription drugs.”169 The Office would target manufacturing in 
three specific cases: 1) when “no company is manufacturing the drug;” 2) 
when “one or two companies produce the drug, and the price has spiked or the 
drug is in shortage[;]” and 3) when “one or two companies produce the drug, 
the price is a barrier to patient access, and the drug is an ‘essential medicine’ 
by the World Health Organization.”170 The Office’s first task would be to 
lower insulin prices, with a mandate to begin production of insulin within one 
year.  
E. GREATER ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
Increased enforcement of anticompetitive practices by the FTC could 
address some of the practices that enable generic drug price increases. The 
FTC could also continue to scrutinize mergers and acquisitions in the generic 
pharmaceutical sector to protect against market consolidation in certain generic 
drug marketplaces. It did so in 2016, when Teva was required to divest 
seventy-nine generic drugs before merger with Allergan’s generic business,171 
as well as in 2018, when it required Amneal and Impax to divest ten generic 
drugs before their merger.172 The Senate Finance Committee’s 2016 report on 
 
Windfall-From-InHouse-Compounding/42386; see also Hospital Pharmacies Step Up Compounding Efforts in 
Wake of Meningitis Outbreak, WBUR NEWS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.wbur.org/news/2012/11/28/mgh-
pharmacy-compounding. 
 168. Marc-André Gagnon, Drug Shortages: Searching for a Cure, 7 HEALTHCARE POL’Y 10, 15 (2012).   
 169. Elizabeth Warren & Jan Schakowsky, Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/One-Pager%20-%20Affordable%20Drug%20Manufacturing% 
20Act1.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). The bill was reintroduced in December 2019, accompanied by a joint 
report explaining how an Office of Drug Manufacturing would function and offering a list of “hundreds of 
examples of drugs that are potential candidates for public manufacturing under the bill.” See Press Release, 
Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jan Schakowsky, Schakowsky, Warren Reintroduce Affordable 
Drug Manufacturing Act, Legislation to Radically Reduce Drug Prices through Public Manufacturing of 
Prescription Drugs (Dec. 20, 2019) https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schakowsky-
warren-reintroduce-affordable-drug-manufacturing-act-legislation-to-radically-reduce-drug-prices-through-
public-manufacturing-of-prescription-drugs. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Press Release, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n., FTC Requires Teva to Divest Over 75 Generic Drugs to 
Settle Competition Concerns Related to its Acquisition of Allergan’s Generic Business (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/07/ftc-requires-teva-divest-over-75-generic-drugs-rival-
firms-settle. 
 172. FTC Conditions for Amneal Merger with Impax, PHARMA LETTER (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/ftc-conditions-for-amneal-merger-with-impax.  
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off-patent prescription drug price increases calls on Congress to strengthen the 
FTC’s authority to review and prevent such increases.173  
F. TAXATION 
Some experts have suggested taxing drug price increases that exceed 
health care inflation thresholds.174 This additional tax revenue would then be 
used to fund greater FTC oversight or go toward other initiatives aimed at 
lowering drug prices. A 2017 bill from Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), the Stop Price Gouging Act, was introduced to 
enact such a tax on drug companies.175 Under the bill, drug makers would face 
an excise tax if their price increases exceeded the annual rise in the consumer 
price index for medical care.176 The tax would capture between 50 and 100% 
of the revenue generated from such price increases, with exceptions for good 
cause—such as if the price is still quite low (for example, less than $10 for a 
thirty-day supply), or if there are other available alternatives.177 In 2019, 
Minnesota state legislators introduced a similar proposal.178 
G. GENERIC DRUG PRICE NEGOTIATION 
Granting the federal government greater negotiating power in 
determining the price of generic products on its formularies may also curb 
anticompetitive pricing of pharmaceutical drugs. The Elijah E. Cummings 
Lower Drug Costs Now Act of 2019, which was introduced in September 2019 
and passed the House in December 2019, would require the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain drugs, 
including high-priced generic products.179 
H. STATE-BASED INITIATIVES 
In the absence of federal intervention, several states have developed 
legislation to address the problems. However, federal pre-emption continues to 
limit the implementation of these efforts. In 2013, Maine passed the Pharmacy 
Act, allowing residents to import medications from pharmacies in Canada, the 
UK, New Zealand, or Australia; the law was invalidated two years later as 
exceeding state authority.180 Vermont (2018) and Colorado (2019) ratified 
 
 173. See S. REP. NO. 114-429, at 10 (2016). 
 174. Dylan Scott, Congress is Grilling Pharma CEOs. Here Are 8 Ideas for Bringing Down Drug Prices, 
VOX (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/14/18176707/congress-
drug-prices-hearing-pharmaceutical-ceos. 
 175. Stop Price Gouging Act, S. 1369, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill was reintroduced in 2019. Stop Price 
Gouging Act, S. 378, 116th (2019).  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Excess Prices Tax; Prescription Drugs, H. F. 2819, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2019). 
 179. Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019).  
 180. Michael Fralick et al., The Price of Crossing the Border for Medications, 377 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 
311, 312 (2017).  
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similar legislation approving imports from Canada, but neither law has been 
implemented.181 As of April 2020, twenty-three other states have introduced 
similar proposals.182 
Several states have passed anti-price gouging laws. The first such law, 
which went into effect in October 2017 in Maryland, barred “unconscionable 
increases” in prescription drug prices.183 In April 2019, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals invalidated the law, as it would violate the Interstate 
Commerce Clause by regulating drug sales outside of the state;184 the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.185 Similar legislation had been in the works in 
Louisiana and Illinois at the time of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling.186 Other state 
initiatives to lower drug price include drug pricing transparency laws in 
California (2017),187 Nevada (2017),188 and Oregon (2018).189 Many of these 
state proposals specifically target price-gouging for essential, off-patent 
generic medicines.190 
Other state initiatives seek to lower drug prices through payment 
reform. In 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom (D-CA) introduced a 
proposal to allow the state’s Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, to negotiate 
 
 181. Katie Jickling, Vermont to Advise Feds on Plan to Import Rx Drugs from Canada, VTDigger (Nov. 
27, 2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/11/27/vermont-to-advise-feds-on-plan-to-import-rx-drugs-from-canada/; 
Justin Wingerter, Colorado Will Try to Import Canada’s Prescription Drugs, DENVER POST, 
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/17/colorado-import-canada-prescription-drugs/ (last updated May 17, 
2017, 3:44 PM). 
 182. 2020 State Legislative Action to Lower Pharmaceutical Costs, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH 
POL’Y, https://nashp.org/rx-legislative-tracker-2019/ (last updated Apr. 15, 2020). Such states include 
Louisiana (2018), Utah (2018), Connecticut (2019), Florida (2019), Maine (2019), Minnesota (2019), 
Oklahoma (2019), and West Virginia (2019). Id. 
 183. Carolyn Y. Johnson, A Maryland Law to Prevent “Unconscionable” Price Hikes on Old Drugs Has 
Been Struck Down, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonk/wp/2018/04/13/a-maryland-law-to-prevent-unconscionable-price-hikes-on-old-drugs-has-been-
struck-down/. 
 184. Ovetta Wiggins, Fourth Circuit Appeals Court Strikes Down Maryland’s Drug Price-Gouging Law, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018, 3:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/fourth-circuit-
appeals-court-strikes-down-marylands-drug-price-gouging-law/2018/04/13/6b192130-3f4c-11e8-a7d1-
e4efec6389f0_story.html. 
 185. Lev Facher, Supreme Court Deals a Fatal Blow to Maryland Drug “Price Gouging” Law, STAT 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/19/supreme-court-declines-case-on-maryland-drug-price-
gouging-law/. 
 186. See Johnson, supra note 183. 
 187. Victoria Colliver, California’s Drug Transparency Law Yields Early Surprises, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 
2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/25/california-drug-transparency-law-440090.  
 188. Lydia Ramsey, Nevada Just Passed One of the Strictest Drug Pricing Transparency Laws in the 
Country, BUS. INSIDER (June 15, 2017, 1:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nevada-passes-insulin-
drug-pricing-transparency-bill-2017-6.  
 189. Zachary Brennan, Oregon Governor Signs Drug Price Transparency Bill, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y 
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2018/3/oregon-bill-on-drug-price-
transparency-headed-to-g.  
 190. See NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, supra note 182. Such states include like those 
introduced in Colorado (2018), Minnesota (2018), New Hampshire (2018), New Jersey (2018-2019), Virginia 
(2018), Wisconsin (2018), and Indiana (2019). Id. 
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prescription drug prices on behalf of its 13 million beneficiaries.191 The 
proposal mimics efforts at the federal level to enable drug price negotiation by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.192 In 2018 and 2019, several 
states enacted legislation prohibiting pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) from 
enforcing so-called “gag clauses” penalizing pharmacists for informing 
patients of lower cost drug products.193 Likewise, many bills have passed 
requiring greater price transparency and disclosure from PBMs.194  
Another state-based initiative to lower generic prices is volume-based 
purchasing—states would buy drugs in bulk and redistribute to their residents. 
To date, seven states have proposed such legislation, including New Mexico, 
which established an Interagency Pharmaceuticals Purchasing Council in April 
2019 to “review and coordinate cost-containment strategies for the 
procurement of pharmaceuticals.”195 States have also passed “affordability 
review” legislation seeking to identify over-priced drugs and leverage state 
negotiating power to bring down costs for state residents.196 The strategy, 
applicable to both generic and brand-name drug prices, has been proposed in 
thirteen states and became law in Maryland without the governor’s 
signature.197 The Maryland statute, passed in May 2019, established a 
Prescription Drug Affordability Board, which will “study the entire 
pharmaceutical distribution and payment system” and draft a plan of action for 
how to set limits on drug prices.198 The legislation also set guidelines for 
determining which brand-name and generic drugs need pricing limitations.199  
CONCLUSION 
Though generic entry routinely leads to lower prices, many off-patent 
drugs are expensive and have experienced dramatic price increases. 
Manufacturers often rely upon various profit-maximizing strategies. For 
example, mergers and acquisitions can consolidate generic drug markets, 
making those markets vulnerable to shortages and susceptible to drug price 
increases. The FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative had the unintended effect 
of increasing prices via re-introduction of market exclusivity for previously 
 
 191. Ed Silverman, California Governor Moves to Bolster Negotiating Power for Lower Drug Prices, 
STAT (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2019/01/08/california-drug-prices-executive-
order/. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, supra note 182. 
 194. Id. 
 195. S.B. 8, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2018). 
 196. NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, supra note 182. 
 197. Addressing the Prescription Drug Affordability Crisis:A Golden Opportunity for State Lawmakers, 
FAMILIESUSA https://familiesusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Rx_Drug-Affordability-1.pdf. 
 198. Jane Horvath, Maryland Passes Nation’s First Prescription Drug Affordability Board Legislation, 
NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y (Apr. 15, 2019), https://nashp.org/maryland-passes-nations-first-
prescription-drug-affordability-board-legislation/. 
 199. Id. 
TESSEMA ET AL-71.4.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/20  3:39 PM 
May 2020] GENERIC BUT EXPENSIVE 1047 
competitive generic markets. Although the FDA has made progress toward 
timely approval generic drug applications, delays prolong a brand 
manufacturer’s effective market exclusivity period beyond the expiration of a 
product’s regulatory or patent exclusivity.  
Strategies that encourage more robust generic competition while 
limiting the ability of manufacturers to unilaterally raise prices in vulnerable 
markets may provide financial savings to both payors and patients. Such 
strategies may include importation of generic drugs during drug shortages, and 
continued action by the FDA in preventing and mitigating drug shortages, 
ensuring timely ANDA review and approval, increasing competition from non-
traditional generic manufacturers, and greater FTC enforcement of 
anticompetitive business practices in the pharmaceutical sector.  
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TABLE 1. NOTABLE PRICE INCREASES AND THREATENED INCREASES FOR OFF-
PATENT DRUGS SINCE 2000 
 
Generic Drug 
Name 
Indication for 
Use 
FDA 
Approval 
(Year) 
Niche 
Marketa 
M&Ab Shortage or 
Discontinuationc 
Price 
Increase 
Period 
of Price 
Increase 
Albuterol  Bronchospasm in 
asthma/chronic 
obstructive 
pulmonary 
disease (COPD) 
1981 Yes No No $11 to 
$434 per 
100 pills 
2013 to 
2014 
Benazepril/HCTZ Hypertension 1991 Yes No Yes $34 to 
$149 per 
bottle of 
100 20-
25mg 
tablets 
 
Calcium-EDTA Lead poisoning 1953 Yes Yes No $950 to 
$26,927 
per 
package 
of vials 
2013 to 
2014 
Chlorambucil [1] 1) Lymphatic 
leukemia;  
2) 
Lymphosarcoma;  
3) Hodgkin 
lymphoma 
1957 Yes No No N/A 2012 to 
2015 
Clomipramine 1) Depression;  
2) Panic attacks;  
3) Obsessive-
compulsive 
disorder 
1989 No No No $0.34 to 
$8.43 
per 
capsule 
2013 to 
2014 
Corticotropin [2] 1) Infantile 
seizures;  
2) Multiple 
sclerosis;  
3) Rheumatoid 
arthritis; 
4) Lupus 
erythematosus 
1952 Yes No No $40 to 
~$40,00
0 per 
vial 
2001 to 
2019 
Cycloserine Active 
pulmonary and 
extrapulmonary 
tuberculosis 
1964 Yes Yes Yes $500 to 
$10,800 
per 30 
capsules 
One-
time, 
August 
2016 
Dichlorphenamide 
[3] 
Primary 
hyperkalemic 
periodic paralysis 
1958 Yes Yes No $50 to 
$15,000 
per 100 
pills 
2001 to 
2017 
Digoxin 1) Mild to 
moderate 
congestive heart 
failure;  
2) Atrial 
fibrillation 
1954 Yes No Yes $0.11 to 
$1.10 
per pill 
2012 to 
2014 
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Divalproex ER 1) Bipolar mania;  
2) Epilepsy;  
3) Migraine 
prophylaxis 
1983 No No Yes $31 to 
$235 per 
bottle of 
80 pills 
2013 to 
2014 
Doxycycline [4] Bacterial 
infections (e.g. 
typhus fever, 
STDs, respiratory 
tract infections) 
1967 No No Yes $4 to 
$191 per 
fifty 100 
mg 
tablets 
2013 to 
2014 
Epinephrine 
autoinjector 
1) Anaphylaxis;  
2) Hypotension 
associated with 
septic shock 
1987 Yes No Yes $103.50 
to 
$608.61 
per twin 
pack 
2009 to 
2016 
Glycopyrrolate Preoperative 
antimuscarinic to 
reduce salivary, 
tracheobronchial, 
and pharyngeal 
secretions 
1961 Yes No No $65 to 
$1,277 
per ten 
vials 
2013 to 
2014 
Indomethacin 1) Rheumatoid 
arthritis;  
2) Ankylosing 
spondylitis 
1963 Yes Yes Yes $90 to 
$1,500 
per three 
vials 
2005 to 
2006 
Isoproterenol [5] 1) Mild to serious 
episodes of heart 
block; 2) Cardiac 
arrest;  
3) Bronchospasm 
during anesthesia 
1956 Yes Yes No $2,183 
to 
$13,097 
per ten 5 
mL vials 
One-
time, 
February 
2015 
Lomustine 1) Primary and 
metastatic brain 
tumors;  
2) Hodgkin 
lymphoma 
1976 Yes Yes No $50 to 
$768 per 
dose 
2013 to 
2017 
Mebendazole Gastrointestinal 
infection (e.g. 
hookworm and 
roundworm) 
1974 Yes Yes No $1.60 to 
$442 per 
dose 
2011 to 
2016 
Mechlorethamine 1) Palliative 
treatment of 
Hodgkin 
lymphoma 
(Stages III and 
IV);  
2) 
Lymphosarcoma;  
3) Lymphocytic 
leukemia 
1949 Yes Yes Yes $77 to 
$548 per 
month 
One-
time, 
February 
2006 
Naloxone [6] Respiratory 
depression in 
opioid overdose 
1971 Yes No No $1.84 to 
$31.66 
per two 
vials 
2005 to 
2014 
Neostigmine [7] 1) Myasthenia 
gravis;  
2) Postoperative 
distention and 
urinary retention;  
3) Reversal of 
non-depolarizing 
neuromuscular 
1931 
(patented) 
Yes Yes No $25 to 
$121 per 
bottle 
2013 to 
2014 
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blocking agents 
Penicillamine [8] 1) Wilson 
disease;  
2) Cystinuria;  
3) Rheumatoid 
arthritis 
1970 Yes Yes Yes $445 to 
$26,188 
per 
treatmen
t 
2010 to 
2015 
Pravastatin Hyperlipidemia;  1991 No No No $27 to 
$196 per 
bottle 
2013 to 
2014 
Praziquantel [9] Parasites (e.g. 
Schistosoma 
mekongi and liver 
flukes) 
1982 Yes Yes No N/A 2015 
Procarbazine Hodgkin 
lymphoma (stage 
III and IV) 
1969 Yes No No $0.60 to 
$55 per 
pill 
2004 to 
2005 
Pyrimethamine Toxoplasmosis 1953 Yes Yes No $13.50 
to $750 
per dose 
One-
time, 
August 
2015 
Sodium 
nitroprusside [10] 
Acute 
hypertensive 
crisis 
1981 Yes Yes No $2,148 
to 
$6,445 
per ten 2 
mL vials 
One-
time, 
February 
2015 
Tiopronin Prevention of 
nephrolithiasis 
1988 Yes Yes No $1.50 to 
$30 per 
dose 
One-
time, 
August 
2014 
Trientine  Wilson disease 1985 Yes Yes No $652 to 
$21,267 
per 
treatmen
t  
2010 to 
2015 
 
a As defined in this Article, a “niche market” is one with three or fewer 
manufacturers for a given drug. 
b Defined as merger or acquisition activity related to the drug within a year of 
the relevant price increase (or threatened increase). 
c Defined as being listed in the “FDA’s Drug Shortages” section of the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration website. Current and Resolved Drug Shortages 
and Discontinuations Reported to FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/drugshortages/default.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2020). 
[1] Chlorambucil manufacturer threatened to destroy supply and raise prices in 
Italy.200 
 
 200. See Nick Mulcahy, Destroy Them: One Way to Up Price of Generic Cancer Drugs, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 
17, 2017) https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/878652; see also Alex Keown, Drug Giant Aspen 
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[2] Includes a one-time increase of 12,900% in 2007 (Questcor).201 
[3] Most significant increase by Sun in 2015 when it gained an orphan drug 
designation for periodic paralysis.202 
[4] Doxycycline’s percent increases varied from 5000% to 8200% depending 
on dosage strength, number of pills, and capsule/tablet formulations (Sen. 
Sanders letter to Sun Pharma described increases in “average market price”).203 
[5] Isoproterenol was since raised to $17,901 for ten 5 mL vials, representing a 
cumulative 720% increase.204 
[6] At the time, the three manufacturers of naloxone each produced a different 
formulation: Hospira (intravenous); Adapt (intranasal); Evzio (intramuscular). 
Kaleo’s product also increased in price by 500% from 2014 to 2016.205 
[7] Flamel also increased the price by 446% from 2014 to 2015.206 
[8] Includes a one-time increase of 300% for penicillamine in July 2015.207 
[9] In 2014, Turing threatened to purchase the product and increase its price 
from $100 per treatment to $100,000 per treatment.208 
 
Pharmacare Plotted to Destroy Cancer Medicine to Jack Up Prices, BIOSPACE (Apr. 17, 2017) 
https://www.biospace.com/article/drug-giant-aspen-pharmacare-plotted-to-destroy-cancer-medicine-to-jack-
up-prices-/. 
 201. Andrew Pollack, Questcor Finds Profits, at $28,000 a Vial, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2012). 
 202. Troy Brennan, Manipulating the Orphan Drug Act: What an Orphan Designation for an Old Drug 
Means for Payors, CVS HEALTH (Feb. 21, 2017) https://payorsolutions.cvshealth.com/insights/manipulating-
orphan-drug-act; Carolyn Y. Johnson, High prices make once-neglected ‘orphan’ drugs a booming business, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/high-prices-make-once-
neglected-orphan-drugs-a-booming-business/2016/08/04/539d0968-1e10-11e6-9c81-
4be1c14fb8c8_story.html. 
 203. Letter from Representative Elijah Cummings, Ranking Member on the Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform for the U.S. House of Representatives, & Senator Bernie Sanders, Chairman of the Subcomm. 
on Primary Health & Aging for the U.S. Senate, to Dilip S. Shanghvi, Managing Dir. for Sun Pharm. Indus., 
Inc., 2 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/letter-to-mr-sanghvi-managing-director-sun-
pharmaceutical-industries-inc?inline=file. 
 204. Sen. Susan M. Collins & Sen. Claire McCaskill, Sudden Price Spikes in Off-Patent Prescription 
Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Health Care System, 
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING FOR THE U.S. SENATE 64 (2016) https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/Drug%20Pricing%20Report.pdf. 
 205. Ravi Gupta et al., Perspective, The Rising Price of Naloxone—Risks to Efforts to Stem Overdose 
Deaths, NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1609578; 
Meredith Cohn, Maryland pharmaceutical company buys maker of overdose Narcan for $735 million, 
BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 29, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-emergent-buys-
narcan-maker-20180829-story.html. 
 206. Eric Sagonowsky, “Random,” Unpredictable” Drug Price Hikes Send Costs Skyward at U.S. 
Hospitals, Report Says, FIERCEPHARMA (Oct. 12, 2016, 11:06 AM) https://www.fiercepharma.com/ 
pharma/drug-price-hikes-lead-to-skyrocketing-costs-at-u-s-hospitals-report-says; NORC, TRENDS IN HOSPITAL 
INPATIENT DRUG COSTS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 19 (2016) https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/aha-
fah-rx-report.pdf. 
 207. See Collins & McCaskill, supra note 204, at 54; Zachary Brennan, Senate Committee Offers Inside 
Look at the Ride and Fall of Valeant Pharmaceuticals, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF’LS SOC’Y: REGULATORY 
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[10] Sodium nitroprusside was since raised to $8809 for ten 2 mL vials, 
representing a cumulative 310% increase.209 
 
 208. Adam Feurstein, Ousted Retrophin CEO Sold Stock While Urging Investors to Buy, STREET (Nov. 25, 
2014, 12:41 PM) https://www.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/ex-retrophin-ceo-sold-stock-while-publicly-
urging-investors-to-buy-12965617. 
 209. See Collins & McCaskill, supra note 204, at 6.  
